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 attacks have shown that, by subduing the crew and passengers, hijackers can take 
control of a civil aircraft and use it as guided weapon. Air transport seems to be a very attractive target for 
terrorists and actual/new potential malicious attacks that can give rise to aviation industry cannot be 
discarded. There is a need to develop appropriate means to counteract malicious attacks while 
maintaining current safety levels. 
Apart from the damage and destruction that can cause these adverse attacks, there are also ripple effects 
in the form of negative impact on the manufacturing, finance, service industries and media impact on 
public confidence as evidenced by the immediate drop in passenger numbers following 11 September 
attacks,   
The SOFIA project (co-funded by the European Commission under the 6th Framework Programme), is a 
response to the challenge of developing concepts and techniques enabling the safe and automatic return to 
ground of an airplane in the event of hostile actions, i.e. when authorized pilots have been neutralized. 
Activities in this sense have been started in the framework of the SAFEE SP3 project (Secure Aircraft in 
the Future European Environment Sub-Project 3, co-funded by the European Commission under the 6th 
Framework Programme). The SOFIA project is proposed as the continuation of the SAFEE SP3 works on 
the Flight Reconfiguration Function (FRF), the system which automatically returns the aircraft to ground 
under a security threat. SOFIA designs architectures for integrating the FRF system into several 
typologies of avionics for civil transport aircraft; developes one of these architectures; validates (following 
the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology – E-OCVM) the FRF concept and the means 
to integrate it in the current ATM. Safety assessments of the FRF system have been also performed at 
aircraft and operational (ATC) levels.  
This paper presents the main findings and results, highlighting the need to deeply consider and assess 
safety implications when developing a security system. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Europe is researching in the security aviation field taking benefit from the 6th Framework Programme 
sponsored by the European Commission (EC) [1]. Within such initiative several projects, participated by 
key European companies in the sector, are investigating in the Flight Reconfiguration Function (FRF) 
arena, e.g., the SAFEE and the SOFIA projects. These projects are the response to the EC concerns 
regarding the aviation security. Such concerns are derived from the results achieved by the Advisory 
Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe (ACARE) group. These results conforms the VISION 2020 
and are presented in the ACARE Strategic Research Agenda (SRA2) [2]. The SOFIA outcomes rely on 
the SAFEE project results. Meanwhile the SAFEE project provides the aircraft with the capacity to detect 
the on-board hostile action and perform a diversion to take the aircraft up to a secure area; the SOFIA 
project develops the FRF system that takes the control of the aircraft and manages its safe return to 
ground under a security emergency (e.g. hijacking) [3]. 
The FRF developed in the SOFIA project is the response from several leading European companies - 
Isdefe (coordinator), Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS), GALILEO Avionica, Skysoft, Alenia SIA, 
                                                           
*
 This paper publishes the results of the SOFIA project performed by this author when he was working for 
ISDEFE 
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THALES Avionics, Instytut Lotnictwa (IoA), Rheinmetall Defence Electronics (RDE) and Diamond 
Aircraft Industries - to the demand from the society of improving the security of the aircraft operation. 
And the improvement is gotten in an autonomous way, as requested in the ACARE SRA2 [2]. 
Furthermore, SOFIA project analyses the integration into the airspace of such airplane flown by the FRF 
and the requirements imposed to the ATC system, and assesses the implications of this new development 
in the regulatory and certification frameworks. 
II. DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL 
The main objective of the SOFIA project [3] is the validation of the Flight Reconfiguration Function 
system and the assessment of its integration into the airspace. SOFIA is mainly a technological project, 
but also dedicates an important effort in assessing the  operational and regulatory issues related with the 
integration of the FRF system into the airspace. The operational assessment approach is not only a 
theoretical study but also practical since the validation exercises consider the interaction of FRF with the 
airspace. 
Taking the fact of the clear symbiosis between the FRF system and the Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS), SOFIA considers the UAS development and progresses as a constant reference in the project. This 
reference is not only present in the operational aspects, but also in the technological ones that enables the 
integration of the UAS into the airspace. For a few years, works are focused on the operation of UAS in 
non-segregated airspace, and in particular on the “sense and avoid” concept, that will enable to detect any 
other aircraft, and therefore to define and fly the appropriate trajectory permitting the collision avoidance. 
SOFIA follows a stepwise approach in its development, formed by four main interrelated steps, 
facilitating a clear continuation of the activities. SOFIA is split in four main steps: 
• Assessment on the issues related with the operation of the FRF. 
• Design of the FRF system: functions, databases, components, interfaces… 
• Development of the FRF system for enabling the validation exercises. 
• Validation of the FRF system and its integration into the airspace. 
A. STEP 1: Assessment of the Operational Issues 
The main goal of this step is to define the future FRF environment, and thus prospects forthcoming 
avionics architectures considering in particular what can be expected for the features relevant to FRF, 
which are around Flight Control and Management and air-ground communication. Furthermore, the task 
studies the ATM environment that can be expected for the timeframe for the FRF implementation 
(initially 2025), in order to define, together with the modalities of the FRF, the integration into that 
environment and the procedures required for the management of FRF-controlled aircraft flying 
autonomously in the airspace. The task also assesses the avionics architectures where the FRF system will 
have to be integrated. This activity is quite interesting for the project because the determined environment 
for the FRF deployment is the reference for the whole project in two key aspects: FRF functions and 
validation exercises. 
Once the FRF environment is defined, the challenge of integrating the aircraft equipped with the FRF 
system into the airspace is affordable. In the current situation, aircraft are controlled by pilots who 
interact with air traffic controllers (ATCO). The ATCO can command the pilot to execute maneuvers 
(increase speed, change flight level, direct to a new waypoint…) that the pilot is in charge of executing. 
But when due to threats on-board the FRF takes in control of the aircraft, the data link remains as the only 
possibility to communicate the controller with the FRF, by sending flight plans that the FRF will execute. 
But even this possibility can be disrupted. Then, the ATCO gets an aircraft flying its own flight plan, 
without any possibility of being commanded from the ground systems. In both events, new procedures are 
needed to guide the ATCO behavior. Such new procedures are proposed by the SOFIA project. SOFIA 
also introduces the need of a Ground Security Decision Station (GSDS) to manage these security events. 
A special focus is given to the regulatory and certification issues to which FRF integration gives rise. 
At this point, the reference to the UAS progress reveals crucial, and thus it is used as a main source to 
propose the appropriate regulatory and certification framework for the FRF and the new procedures 
designed for its implementation. With respect to other projects dealing with future ATM environment and 
tackling the problem of integrating autonomously flying aircraft, the distinctive feature of SOFIA is to 
take account of the security – related circumstances under which the autonomous flights occur.  
B. STEP 2: Design of the FRF System 
Its main goal is to specify both the FRF system and its integration into the different avionics 
architectures that can be expected for the future, considering the three operational solutions envisioned for 
the FRF: 
EUROCONTROL Annual Safety&Human Factors R&D Seminar, 21-22 October 2009, Munich 
 
 - 3 - 
• Flight Plan with Negotiation (FRF_N): the FRF executes a flight plan generated on ground and 
transmitted to the FRF via data link. FRF analyses the feasibility of the flight plan according to the 
aircraft conditions and performances. In case of agreement, the flight plan is executed. Otherwise, 
next operational solution is on. 
• Flight Plan without Negotiation (FRF_WN): after negotiation is finished without agreement or 
communication disruption, FRF executes the flight plan elaborated by itself, without any control 
from ground. 
• Military aircraft relay: this is an intermediate step between the two previous operational solutions. 
FRF receives a flight plan from a military aircraft and operates as in the FRF_N solution. 
As most of the FRF implied automation modes are expected to be already present in future aircraft, 
SOFIA more specifically addresses the solutions allowing this automation and the associated mode 
transitions to be performed autonomously with no possibility for a malevolent onboard to intervene. This 
will lead SOFIA to focus especially on FRF interfaces to existing systems and HMI devices, and to 
perform specific in depth safety analyses to define an architecture that fits all of the needs and constraints.  
“Fig. 1” presents how FRF fits into the control chain in the aircraft replacing the pilot and directly 
interacting with the actuators of the airplane control and communication systems. 
 
Fig. 1: FRF Overall Architecture 
 
SOFIA in particular studies the autonomous flight re-planning function with the associated monitoring 
function, and the interfaces to make available onboard surveillance systems which provide the means to 
detect various threats (equipment failure, terrain, traffic or weather hazard) and to autonomously make 
decisions about flight plan update. It is remarkable the iterative process that will be run between the design 
activity and the regulatory, certification and safety assessments. As part of FRF design, SOFIA includes 
thus a study focused on data bases with the aim of identifying FRF-related requirements and specifying, 
with respect to the databases foreseen for future aircraft, the modifications and new data fields that are 
required to fit FRF needs and the set of databases that enables the calculations to be performed by FRF: 
Also worthy of note is the innovation brought about by SOFIA on the ground side regarding the ATM 
procedures and tools, for which the impact of FRF related procedures and functions, are assessed. During 
the FRF design, a safety assessment was carried out. The main goal of this activity has been to propose 
design requirements derived from the safety analysis of the preliminary design at FRF and aircraft level 
and from the safety issues related to the FRF integration into the airspace. Both safety assessments 
comprise the performance of a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and a Preliminary System Safety 
Assessment (PSSA). EUROCONTROL EATMP SAM and SAE ARP 4761 are applied. 
C. STEP 3: Development of the FRF System 
Its main goal is to develop the FRF functions for their validation and set up the simulation 
environments which allow FRF functional validation to be performed according to the objectives and 
requirements set out in the SOFIA validation plan. The task includes the adaptation of already available 
platform components and the development of appropriate new mock-ups components in order to get 
functional test beds ready for carrying out the FRF validation. Only the solutions FRF with Negotiation 
(FRF_N) and the FRF without Negotiation (FRF_WN) will be carried out. 
Five validation platforms are used in the SOFIA project: 
• ATENA, flight simulator developed by GALILEO Avionica. 
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• DFS ATC simulator. 
• IoA´s I-23 Manager aircraft. 
• Diamond Aircraft Industry Twin Star DA42 aircraft. 
D. STEP 4: Validation of the FRF System and its integration into the Airspace 
Its main goal is to perform the validation experiments envisaged for the SOFIA project to assess, first 
whether the design of the FRF system is capable of supporting the functionality required and second, the 
operation of FRF system integrated in the ATC procedures as proposed by SOFIA. The validation 
exercises follow a validation plan elaborated according to the E-OCVM. 
The validation of FRF will be only made on the solutions FRF with Negotiation (FRF_N) and the FRF 
without Negotiation (FRF_WN). To carry out the validation, five experiments are proposed for SOFIA 
according to a stepwise strategy to feed back the development phase with validation results from a first set 
of validation exercises to refine the design and development of the FRF: 
• A preliminary validation of the FRF functions will be carried out during the development phase. 
The ATENA simulator is linked to the DFS ATC simulator. This experiment is focused at refining 
the FRF functions, particularly the assessment of the FRF functions and its integration into the 
airspace. The options Flight re-planning with negotiation and Flight re-planning without 
negotiation modes will be assessed.  
• A flight trial is executed during the development phase to refine the development process by using 
an aircraft provided by the IoA. This trial is focused on the assessment of the Flight re-planning 
without negotiation mode. 
• A validation exercise is run in the THA AIRLABTM simulator to assess the feasibility of the FRF 
solution for the commercial aircraft world. 
• A flight trial by using an aircraft provided by DAI. This trial will be focused on the assessment of 
the Flight re-planning with negotiation mode thanks to the linkage to the DFS ATC facility. 
The validation objectives are those related to the demonstration of the FRF concept reliability in 
realistic environments: Issues relative to the appropriateness and feasibility of the FRF operational modes, 
evaluation of the impact on the ground segment (ATCO work load, flight plan creation on ground), cross 
checking and execution of the flight plan and landing of the aircraft by FRF are to be assessed in SOFIA. 
The next list addresses a detailed relation of validation objectives to be achieved in SOFIA. 
• Validation of the impact of the FRF system on ground: 
o Assessment of the reliability of the new ATC procedures and management in a FRF scenario. 
o Assessment on the reaction of the ATCO when FRF is activated and ATCO’s workload upon 
the different FRF operational modes.  
• Validation of the FRF system on-board: 
o Creation of the flight plan by FRF on air. 
o Crosschecking by FRF of the flight plan received from ground. 
o Execution of the flight plan and landing of the aircraft by FRF. 
III. SOFIA DESIGN ACHIVEMENTS 
A. FRF Environment 
In an emergency situation (e.g. a security crisis on-board as it is the case in SOFIA) the highest priority 
is to land the aircraft as quickly as possible. Therefore the flight to the selected aerodrome shall be as short 
as possible. The aircraft shall normally fly directly to the aerodrome. This part of the FRF flight will be the 
same for all the three FRF solutions introduced in the following paragraphs. 
1) Solution 1: Autonomous Flight Re-planning 
 
For the FRF, it is very easy to create a new flight plan to a special emergency aerodrome, because all 
necessary information is available on board. The information about the crisis on board, the status of the 
aircraft and databases about the airspace are part of the safety and security systems. Information about the 
conditions at the selected aerodrome could be available, e.g. via ATIS. En-route weather information could 
also be received via data link or on board weather radar. As all information is available a route to the 
airport can be calculated quickly. FRF can down link the route to the GSDS, so ATC can keep the 
surrounding controlled traffic away. GSDS can also inform the selected airport and security authorities. In 
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case of data link problems the FRF aircraft flies to the aerodrome without information to/from GSDS. ATC 
monitors the flight and using predicting techniques (ATC tools) ATC can anticipate the possible aerodrome 
selected by the FRF system. Thus ATC can also inform the corresponding aerodrome and the authorities. 
This procedure is similar to today’s procedure for an aircraft with r/t failure. Therefore this solution is easy 
to work, clearly structured and preparation time is relatively short. This is the preferred solution for the 
controllers according to the outcomes from the workshop hold with them at the DFS. 
 
2) Solution 2: Flight Re-planning with Negotiation 
 
Due to the negotiation between the FRF system and the GSDS, the preparation phase in solution 2 is 
more time consuming. For the negotiation, data must be exchanged via data link. Depending on the 
technical equipment this data exchange may take longer. Additionally, during the negotiation phase two 
decisions must be taken. At first GSDS has to decide about the destination aerodrome (and the alternative); 
and secondly, the FRF system has to decide about the FPLN proposed by GSDS. Both decisions need extra 
time to compute. If the negotiation fails, the FRF uses the flight plan calculated by itself, reverting to 
Solution 1. 
This information will be down linked to the GSDS through a secure data link. Regarding the premises 
made above, the aircraft will consume more time for the preparation phase than in Solution 1. Due to the 
decisions foreseen in the procedures, the structure of this solution is more complex. For the controllers this 
procedure is not as easy to work as Solution 1. 
3) Solution 3: Mil. A/C Relay 
 
Regarding the amount of time required and the complexity of the procedures, Solution 3 is the least 
preferred solution. Intercepting the FRF aircraft requires time. A specially equipped military aircraft must 
be informed and flown to intercept it. Then the military aircraft has to connect to the FRF aircraft and 
receive the status information. Based on this information the GSDS must calculate a new route to the 
emergency aerodrome. This information is to be transmitted via the military aircraft to the FRF flight. Then 
the FRF aircraft can start the flight plan. If the connection between the military aircraft and the FRF flight 
or the connection between the military aircraft and GSDS fails, the FRF system creates a flight plan and 
follows it to the emergency aerodrome. The interception of the FRF aircraft as well as the transmission of 
the data to GSDS via the military aircraft and back to the FRF aircraft are both time consuming. Due to the 
integration of a third party (military aircraft) in the negotiation process the complexity of this solution is 
higher than in the other solutions. 
4) Discussion on the solutions 
 
Initially a combination between the three solutions was envisaged. The proposed stepwise approach 
started with solution 2, then solution 3 and, as a last back up, solution 1. This approach is very time 
consuming, very complex and not easy to work for all participating parties, particularly the Air Traffic 
Controllers (ATCO). Therefore in SOFIA a clear structured solution is preferred. This preferred solution 
could either be solution 1, solution 2, or solution 3. In solution 2 and solution 3 elements of solution 1 are 
integrated as back up procedures if failures occur during the normal procedure. So a combination of 
solution 2 and 1 or solution 3 and 1 is foreseen, not as a stepwise approach but as one solution. However 
the preferred solution according to the ATCO inputs is solution 1. 
B. Certification and Regulation 
SOFIA project has analyzed the impact of the Flight Reconfiguration Function (FRF) in the 
certification and regulatory frameworks. SOFIA has kept several meetings with ICAO, EASA and 
EUROCONTROL. 
The major demand regarding certification activities was detected on the air segment. Although the 
philosophy underlying the design of the FRF system shall pursue compliance with current regulatory 
framework, since the FRF system is a particularly innovative one, the existence of conflicts or gaps in 
current regulations is inevitable, and some changes in those regulations will be required in order to make 
possible the certification of the FRF system. Most conflicts detected in the current certification framework 
analyzed stem from being the pilot out of the loop when the aircraft is under command of the FRF system. 
In particular, the main associated issues are the fact that there is no pilot to 1) take over control of the 
aircraft when a critical system fails, and 2) to monitor malfunctions or emergencies on-board so that the 
pilot can react to them. Requirements have been derived and became a valuable input for the design of the 
FRF system from all the analyzed codes for the air segment. 
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On the ATC segment the certification issues are not so problematic, as ATC does not influence directly 
the FRF flight, only the configuration of already existing certified ATC systems has to be changed. Also 
the interface to the GSDS is based on existing technology. 
On the ground segment the GSDS is the only relevant system that has to be certified. The 
responsibilities for the certification of the GSDS or the certification process are not defined. As the GSDS 
has the ability to influence the FRF flight directly it has to be regarded as a combination of air and ground 
segments. For regulatory issues, at least one of the proposed ATCO procedures has to be confirmed by 
ICAO. All developed procedures have to be integrated into the ATM. Therefore the ANSPs procedures and 
documentations, including training, have to be updated with the FRF ones.  
With regard to the regulatory issues of the air segment, as in the case of the certification issues, the 
main conflict with regulations stem from being the pilot out of the loop when the aircraft is under 
command of the FRF, since current regulatory framework assume, explicit or implicitly, that a pilot is on 
board to follow the prescribed procedures. Another important issue leading to conflicts with regulations is 
the loss of communications with ground when the aircraft is under command of the FRF system, since in 
this situation GSDS is not informed on the aircraft status and evolution of the crisis on-board, and no vital 
information can be up-linked to the aircraft when necessary. In addition, other aspects considered in the 
analysis of regulatory issues are Training, Aircraft Maintenance and Security. Regarding training new 
programmes dealing with ‘security avionic systems’ should be developed. Analogously, procedures for 
handling these special systems should be developed for Aircraft Maintenance Organizations, based on 
requirements to be included in the regulatory framework. 
C. FRF Design 
In order to enable the implementation of the FRF the airplane avionics must be fly-by-wire. The design 
of the FRF has resulted in a set of eight (8) functions and three (3) databases (DB). The functions perform 
the actions assigned to the FRF to command and control the flight, and communicate with GSDS during 
the FRF flight of the airplane in emergency. 
The DB provides the data needed to enable the FRF to perform the calculations for the flight 
reconfiguration.  
The FRF functions are described hereafter: 
The Decision Centre Function (DCF) shall manage the different FRF capabilities. It shall act like an 
event controller. It performs the FRF initialization (including built in test), modes management and 
systems interface management (including update of databases). The modes management deals with the 
four FRF modes: START, IDLE, ARMED and ACTIVE, described hereafter: 
• START: power up of the system. 
• IDLE: mode during the normal of operation of the airplane in absence of security emergencies or 
threats. 
• ARMED: the FRF primary functionality is to calculate a new flight plan that flies the aircraft to a 
safe landing. 
• ACTIVE: the FRF executes the flight plan calculated when in ARMED mode and prepares the 
aircraft for landing. 
The Health Monitoring System Interface (HMS) gathers data from systems critical to the operation 
of the FRF, and performs corrective actions in case of failure in order to ensure continuity of the FRF 
service. If a failure is critical enough not to be recoverable, the FRF will notify it to ground (GSDS). This 
will give the GSDS the opportunity to consider the best course of action for the given situation. 
The Route Planning and Static Flight Monitoring (RPL) generates a suitable flight plan to a secure 
landing airfield. It takes into account the external airfield selection criteria and authorizations and the 
information coming from the FRF databases regarding commercial routes and airports, terrain, restricted 
area and military airports, static and dynamic Prohibited Security Areas and weather. 
The Guidance and Leg Management (GLM) monitors the flight of the aircraft along the route 
continuously evaluating the displacements from the desired path and providing inputs to the autopilot for 
guidance. It also performs all the operations of leg change and connection. 
The Route Re-planning (RRP) performs any type of amendment to the flying plan during its 
execution due to external constraints (e.g., traffic, weather…). Procedures similar to the (RPL) shall be 
applicable. 
The Dynamic Flight Monitoring (DFM) consists of different sub-functions that shall be activated 
during the FRF flight of the airplane: 
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• A/C Performance Monitoring, in order to provide all the necessary information (fuel consumption, 
timing information etc.) to FRF to perform a check along the selected path, 
• Resolving conflicts with static obstacles, e.g. terrain and PSAs, 
• Resolving conflicts with air traffic, performing automatically the TCAS procedures, 
• Resolving conflicts with bad weather conditions 
The External Communication (COM) produces the information to be exchanged between FRF and 
the GSDS: FRF Mode, FMS acceptance/rejection of the GSDS flight plan, selected airfield to land, 
selected flight path, Modified Flight Path and Health Data. 
The Display Management (DSM) provides the interface between FRF and Display Function. As a 
general philosophy, in order to respond to the terrorist attack on board, a solution that prevents hijackers to 
know the real state of the aircraft (engines, trajectory etc) is preferred, only displaying the FRF mode. 
The FRF databases are described hereafter. 
The Static and Dynamic Database stores static data as terrain, obstacles, Prohibited for Security Areas 
(PSA), civil and military aerodromes and their characteristics to deal with threats, restricted areas, and 
dynamic data as FPLN and airport selected, weather data, etc. 
The Aircraft Performance Database, needed to perform the guidance function. 
The Navigation Database, with Jeppessen plus airliner specific data. 
D. FRF Safety Assessment 
Safety is a requirement “society” poses on the air transport. Although air travel is one of the safest 
forms of transportation, an increase in the number of accidents will not be accepted, not even in a context 
of growing traffic or emerging threats, such as for instance related to security. Hence the challenge to 
industry and regulatory agencies is to make an already safe system even safer. 
The FRF provides a solution to a situation with a potentially catastrophic ending caused by the 
presence of a security threat. When a hijacking (or similar threat) occurs on-board an aircraft, the 
probability of losing the aircraft increases considerably, therefore any action taken to mitigate this possible 
end result will significantly improve safety. From this point of view, it might not be necessary to design a 
system to the same level of safety as it is required for current on-board aircraft systems, however the 
inadvertent activation of the FRF shall be strongly prevented. 
The issue of making sure that the FRF is only activated when it should become then crucial. It can be 
demonstrated that the inadvertent activation of the FRF can be dealt with a moderate increase of workload 
by flight crews and will never have catastrophic consequences. Nevertheless, having a lot of spurious FRFs 
will not be acceptable by pilots or airlines and will not be sustainable by the ATS. Therefore requirements 
are necessary to keep this number small enough. 
Since the expected number of FRF like scenarios is still to be better assessed, conservative estimates 
have been performed when imposing safety requirements on the FRF functionalities. Clear show stoppers 
have not been identified although equipment redundancy and additional design effort might be necessary to 
reach some of the targets. 
While the FRF is in operation there are two main modes that have been assessed throughout this work. 
The following two paragraphs discuss the feasibility of the functionalities proposed in the different modes 
from a safety point of view. 
In the ARMED mode, a number of failures in this functional area could endanger the success of the 
FRF mission, not only during the calculation of the first FLPN but also in the hypothetical case that the 
FRF has to recalculate the flight plan and choose a new destination due to unanticipated events (e.g. 
conflict with traffic, change of threat, weather, etc). 
In the ACTIVE mode, safety requirements necessary to guarantee a safe landing without pilot-in-the-
loop are also quite rigorous. This includes not only those functions associated to actions performed to 
configure the airplane for landing but also functions intended to resolve conflicts found on the way to the 
chosen destination (like traffic or weather). 
The following paragraphs discuss the feasibility of the different scenarios from a safety point of view. 
1) Scenario 2: Solution 1 with datalink where the FRF autonomously chooses a 4D route. 
A large proportion of the safety requirements derived seem feasible for this scenario. Clear show 
stoppers (safety requirements that definitely cannot be identified) have not been identified. Nevertheless, a 
number of safety requirements may be very difficult or costly to achieve: 
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• Information regarding the state of the airport, its runways, its navigation equipment and suitability 
of weather conditions for landing are of critical importance for the ‘blind’ landings to be 
performed by the FRF. This poses challenging requirements on availability and quality of the 
information provided to the FRF at the holding as well as the information provided by ATIS when 
the FRF is approaching a certain airport and runway. In case of late information that the selected 
approach and landing can for whatever reason not be performed safely, the FRF has to re-plan a 
runway, airport, approach and possibly even a holding. This process has neither been defined nor 
assessed in the present work. 
• A general issue is the selection of a set of suitable airports where FRF should land. These airports 
on the one hand, should be quiet, such that procedures necessary for clearing approaches, runways 
and their neighborhoods are feasible. On the other hand, the navigation equipment of these airports 
needs to be of very high quality and availability as safe landing of an FRF critically depends on it. 
Such equipment may be relatively costly for such airports. 
• Another general issue is that when overflying cities, nuclear reactors or generally areas where one 
would not want to have security challenged flights such as FRF is considered as a severe situation 
(severity class 2) in itself, this poses challenging requirements to onboard and ground databases 
regarding the corresponding information. 
2) Scenario 3: Solution 2 where the destination airport is negotiated with ATC 
The general situation is that the safety requirements for scenario 3 are equally or less difficult to 
achieve than for scenario 2. This is intuitively clear, as the selected airport and route have been assessed 
and confirmed by ATC in the negotiation process between FRF and ATC. Nevertheless, the difficult safety 
requirements for scenario 2 are generally still a challenge. 
3) Scenario 1: Solution 1 without datalink, where the FRF autonomously chooses a 4D route 
Scenario 1 generally seems very difficult to achieve in a manner satisfying safety objectives and 
requirements. A crucial point on top of the aforementioned requirements, which here are even more 
difficult to achieve, is that the FRF blindly chooses a destiny airport and approach and is then completely 
dependent on ATIS for information to confirm that the actual state of the runway, navigation equipments, 
weather, etcetera allow a safe landing. It seems very difficult to have ATIS contain all necessary 
information of sufficient quality in a sufficiently timely manner, also because the FRF does not inform 
about the airport and route it has selected. For the latter reason, the FRF also implies a considerable 
challenge to ATC. 
The work is not complete, even after the safety assessment has been defined and turned over to the 
system developers responsible for leading the implementation of the FRF. The implementation activities 
should be continuously monitored to ensure that action is being accomplished, any roadblocks to 
implementation are removed and the plan accommodates any newly identified gaps. 
This safety enhancement process is best accomplished in a step-wise fashion to move to the next level 
of maturity. Once the initial action plan has been completed, the process should be repeated in order to 
identify the next safety enhancement actions to implement. 
IV. SOFIA FIRST VALIDATION ACHIVEMENTS 
Following the validation cycle adopted by SOFIA, the first validation exercises were running in 
November 2008. This validation experiment was performed by DFS and GALILEO Avionica (GAL). The 
validation platform used for the experiment was composed by the ATC simulator from DFS and the 
ATENA flight simulator from GAL (see “Fig. 4”). Both simulators were connected through a high wide 
band telephonic line, used to interchange the flight data between both simulators. Solution 1, Flight Plan 
without Negotiation, and Solution 2, Flight Replanning with Negotiation, were tested, involving ATCOs in 
the ATC simulator and a pilot in the ATENA simulator. 
Several objectives for the validation exercise were defined, both with regards to the technical 
performances of the FRF, and the operation of the procedures and connivance with the FRF by the 
ATCOs: 
• Test the FRF capacity to negotiate a flight plan. 
• Test the FRF capacity to crosscheck a flight plan received from ground and accept it. 
• Test the FRF capacity to execute the accepted flight plan. 
• Evaluate the performance of the ATCO when operating in both solutions. 
• Assess the impact of each solution in the work load of the ATCO. 
• Evaluate which solution is preferred by the ATCO and which provides better performances. 
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The environment considered comprises the North of Italy, running a flight departing from Sion airport 
and having the landing scheduled at Milan airport. The flight to be operated by the FRF is inserted in a real 
flight plan occurred in the area a few days ago, and proposed to the ATCOs as another aircraft more to be 
managed. The flight is operated by the pilot in normal conditions until, in the middle of the flight; the FRF 
is activated and takes the control of the airplane. Communication is then established between the GSDS 
(represented by the ATCOs in the exercises) and the FRF, using a data link simulated in the telephonic 
communication. Once the FRF takes possession of the control and command of the airplane, the pilot 
remains out of the loop for the rest of the experiment. Depending on the solution tested, the communication 
between the ATCOs and the FRF includes or not the flight plan negotiation. The destination airport chosen 
to land the aircraft meanwhile the FRF is active is Turin. 
Finally, three previous operational scenarios are considered in the experiment, resulting in three 
different exercises carried out by the ATCOs: 
• Scenario 1, i.e., flight plan without negotiation and without data link. The flight plan adopted by 
the FRF is not downloaded to ground as the data link is out of service. This implies the ATCO is 
not aware of the flight plan the FRF is to execute. 
• Scenario 2, i.e., flight plan without negotiation and with data link in service. This implies the 
ATCO is aware of the FRF intentions as the flight plan is downloaded through the data link. 
• Scenario 3, i.e., flight plan with negotiation. The ATCO has now the capacity to define the flight 
plan to be executed by the FRF. 
The outcomes from these three exercises demonstrate the technical feasibility of the FRF, being able to 
manage the solutions (with and without negotiation) without failures. Even more interesting than these 
conclusions was the assessment of how the human part of the exercises performed. With regards to this, the 
following conclusions can be stated for each of the scenarios tested: 
• Scenario 1, i.e., flight plan without negotiation and without data link. The main concern and 
problem found by the ATCOS is they are not aware of the FRF intents. Therefore they are every 
time reacting to the FRF executions but not medium term prevention is possible. The main risk is 
the time needed by the ATCO to clear the surrounding airspace and to advise the potential airports 
were the airplane could land. The FRF provides the ATCO with a time to react between the alert is 
launched and the FRF starts to execute its flight plan. This time has to be augmented in this 
scenario to enable good and safe ATCO performance (the length of stay in the holding pattern 
should be 15 minutes minimum). The negative point is the time increase could jeopardise the FRF 
performance (more fuel consumption). The affected sector has to be closed completely. With 
regards to the workload, initially, it increases in the affected sector and once this is clear of traffic, 
the workload increases in the surrounding sectors. Due to the uncertainty introduced in the ATCOs 
tasks, this scenario jeopardises the safety of the air traffic system. 
• Scenario 2, i.e., flight plan without negotiation and with data link in service. The concern and 
difficulty in the previous scenario disappear in this second scenario. The ATCOs are aware of the 
flight plan to be executed and the airport to land at by the FRF. Due to the fact that the flight plan 
and the landing airport are known, the traffic flow can be handled almost normal. Only the flights 
to the landing airport must be diverted to other airports. The affected sector does not have to be 
closed completely. ATCOs considered the safety is kept in the current values. 
• Scenario 3, i.e., flight plan with negotiation. The ATCOs generate the flight plan to be executed 
and the airport to land at by the FRF. This supposes an increase in the ATCO work load not well 
accepted by them. Due to the fact that the flight plan and the landing airport are known, the traffic 
flow can be handled almost normal. The only impact is the flights to the landing airport must be 
diverted to other airports. The affected sector does not have to be closed completely. ATCO 
workload increases due the necessity of creating and editing the flight plan for negotiation. ATCOs 
considered the safety is kept in the current values. 
After performing the validation exercises, debriefing sessions were run with the ATCOs participating 
in every exercise. Debates were opened and questionnaires were distributed to gather the information 
needed to evaluate every scenario, the ATCOs preferences, concerns, problems, and in general, all the 
information that could enable a ranking of the scenarios and solutions tested. After the assessment of the 
information, it can be concluded that the most preferred scenario for the ATCOS to operate is Scenario 2, 
followed by Scenario 3 and Scenario 1 in the last position, being this last the unique considered as 
jeopardising the safety of the air traffic system. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The FRF system is proposed as countermeasure to terrorist, hostile actions that aims to use the aircraft 
as a means to affect assets on ground. The affection can be implemented in different ways: crashing the 
aircraft, using it to propagate biological or chemical agents, or to multiply the effects of the explosion of a 
mass destruction weapon on-board the aircraft. As a response to this challenge, SOFIA project [3] develops 
the FRF system that enables the safe, automatic and autonomous return to ground of an airplane in the 
event of hostile actions. To carry out this action, the FRF disables the control and command of the aircraft 
from the cockpit, creates and executes a new flight plan towards a secure airport and lands the aircraft at it. 
Regarding the generation of the flight plan to be executed by the FRF, several options are considered in the 
SOFIA project: The flight plan can be generated in ground (ATC) or in a military airplane and transmitted 
to the aircraft, or created autonomously at the own FRF system. Additionally, the SOFIA project 
investigates the integration of such solution into different airspace environments: current ATM, 
ASAS/ADS-B, automation of ground functions, airspace with/without radar coverage, CDM, 4D trajectory 
negotiation. Finally, SOFIA project also analyses the impact of the regulatory and certification frameworks 
into the FRF system and vice-versa, first, to constrain the FRF design to such frameworks and second, to 
propose new procedures and standards to facilitate the technological development. 
The FRF system developed in the SOFIA project proposes a solution to one of the biggest challenges of 
the future aviation: to make the aircraft more secure by themselves. But it also introduces some interesting 
questions that will have to be solved before these systems start to operate, in order to guarantee the security 
introduced by them. Additionally to the technological development, SOFIA poses the following open 
questions: 
• Who is responsible for the management and upgrading of the FRF database, including the PSA and 
airports? 
• Who is responsible for uploading and upgrading the FRF database into the airplanes? 
• Who is responsible for the designation of the airports capable of dealing with the foreseen threats?, 
and furthermore, 
• Who is responsible for designating to what airport an FRF aircraft is to be deviated? 
• Who is responsible for the aircraft when it is flown by the FRF system: the airliner, the FRF 
manufacturer, the nation of the airliner, the nation of the airspace, the nation of the destination 
airport, EUROCONTROL, the EC, the EDA? 
• What is the responsibility of the ATC system, and particularly of the ATCOs, when dealing with 
an FRF airplane? 
• Who is responsible on ground for generating the new flight plan for the FRF aircraft? 
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